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CRIMINAL TRIALS WITHOUT A JURY IN CONNECTICUT
WILLIAM M. MALTBIE*
In 1921, the legislature of Connecticut passed a law, the second
section of which provides as follows:
"In all criminal causes, prosecutions and proceedings the party
accused may, if he so elect when called upon to plead, be tried by the
court instead of by the jury; and in such cases the court shall have
jurisdiction to hear and try such cause and render judgment and
sentence thereon."
3
Aside from the fact that Connecticut thereby became one of the
few states which permit those accued of crime of whatever-degree to
waive the customary trial by jury and to elect a trial to the court, some-
what of interest is added by reason of the circumstance that Con-
necticut once before tried the experiment of such a law, and quickly
repealed it. In 1874, with little debate or comment, the legislature
passed a statute in terms similar to that of 1921 quoted above, but in
1878, with considerable debate and some little feeling, repealed it.4
The burden of attack upon the law was borne by Hon. Charles B.
Andrews, who was then a member of the House of Representatives, but
who the next year was elected governor of the state, and upon the
conclusion of two terms in that office, was appointed to the bench
of the Superior Court, and subsequently to that of the Supreme Court
of Errors, where he served as chief justice from 1889 to 1901. That
in his argument he spoke the minds of the judges there is every reason
to believe, both from his position and associations and from certain
contemporaneous circumstances. There was then pending a notorious
prosecution against three men who in an attempt to escape from the
State Prison had killed a watchman, and of whom two had elected
trial by the court and one trial by the jury. The trial of the latter had
been commenced about the time the repeal bill came before the legis-
lature for action, and a mistrial had come about due to the misconduct
of one of the jurors. According to the practice then existing, two
judges had presided at the trial, one of whom was Judge Carpenter;
*Justice of the Supreme Court of Errors, Hartford, Conn.
3Public Acts of 1921, Chap. 267.
4Enacted, Public Acts of 1874, Chap. LVI; repealed, Public Acts of 1878,
Chap. LXII.
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and several others had been called into consultation on the case, so that
it is highly probable that the situation growing out of the choice of
different modes of trial by the accused, and the possibility of varying
results, was canvassed. Moreover, in State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349,
which came to the Supreme Court after the repeal of the law, but had
been tried under it, and so involved its constitutionality, Judge Car-
penter wrote the opinion. In the course of it, he said: "That the law
is impolitic and unwise, especially in its application to capital cases and
felonies generally, we are ready to concede to the fullest extent. We
cannot believe that it is wise or expedient to place the life or liberty
of any person accused of crime, even by his own consent, at the disposal
of any one man or two men, so long as man is a fallible being. But
that is a question for the legislature, and the legislature has recon-
sidered the matter, and very properly repealed the obnoxious law."
Judge Andrews' argument against the law, as it appears in a brief
but apparently accurate report in the Hartford Courant of the next
morning, was that it was probably unconstitutional; that it was de-
signed to aid criminals and fathered by those interested in helping
their escape from punishment; that a "most unseemly spectacle" might
come about from varying results where two jointly accused of crime
elected trial by differing methods; that after all, judges are not as
sound triers of the issues of fact presented in criminal cases as are
juries, and are apt "to be led away from strict justice by some subtle
technicality of law raised b'y counsel for the accused"; and, "in closing
he spoke of the tragedy at the State Prison resulting in the death of
a watchman and said that the chief opposition to the (repealing) bill
came from the counsel for the murderers." One suspects that he
closed with a decided argumenturn ad hominem, and that portion of
his argument may be disregarded. So, too, the constitutionality of the
law has been established for Connecticut, and it is not the purpose of
the present article to discuss it.5 Judge Andrews' other arguments do
5State v. Rankin, 102 Conn. 46, 127 At. 916, following State v. Worden, 46
Conn. 349. To the same effect, Edwards v. State, 45 N. J. L. 419; State v. Ste-
vens, 84 N. J. L. 561, 87 Atl. 118; Wartner v. State, 102 Ind. 51, 1 N. E. 65; and
see the very interesting arguments of F. W. Grinnell, VIII Mass. Law Quar. 7,
and IX id. 53 and 61, and a note, XXI Harvard Law Rev. 212. It must be con-
fessed that the weight of authority is decidedly opposed to the right of an
accused to waive a jury at least in cases more serious than misdemeanors.
Freeman v. United States, (C. C. A.) 227 Fed. 732; Coates v. United States, (C.
C. A.) 290 Fed. 134; Paulsen v. People, 195 Ill. 507, 63 N. E. 144; State v. Wil-
liams, 195 Iowa 374, 191 N. W. 790. following State v. Carman, 63 Iowa 130, 18
N. W. 691; State v. Hataway, 153 L . 751, 96 So. 556; Swart v. Kimball, 43 Mich.
443, 5 N. W. 635; Michaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb. 761, 101 N. W. 1007; People
v. Cosmo, 205 N. Y. 91, 98 N. E. 408; State v. Pulliam, 184 N. C. 681, 114 S. E.
394; State v. Smith, 184 Wis. 664, 200 N. W. 638. In Maryland the practice of
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afford a starting point from which to consider the working of the
present law during the four years it has been in effect. There is, of
course, no way by which any accurate tests may be applied, and so,
aside from determining the relative percentages of verdicts of guilty
in cases tried to the court and those tried to the jury, the method
adopted was to send a questionnaire to the judges of the courts where
the law is being used, to prosecutors and public defenders in those
courts, and to a considerable number of attorneys who either practice
in the criminal courts or might be supposed to be interested in and
informed as to the actual operation of the law.
Before taking up judge Andrews' arguments, however, it is per-
haps best to follow the practice of the newspaper reporter, who sums
up his story in his opening paragraph. The last question asked was:
Would you favor a continuance of the system established by the law
in question?- To that the answers were surprising in their approach
to unanimity. Of the judges, all favored a continuance of the system,
although five would prefer that capital cases should be excepted, and
one would also except most cases of felony. Of the prosecutors, eight
were unqualifiedly favorable to the new order, two favored its con-
tinuance until it had had a more thorough trial, and two were opposed
to it. Of the public defenders, all favored a continuance of the system,
although one suggested a limitation to offenses where the penalty fixed
by statute did not exceed five years. Of the attorneys, seventy-nine
favored the new order, three thought it ought to be modified as regards
trials for murder, and three were opposed to it; of the latter, however,
two may properly be said to have an unusual bent for and leaning
toward trials before juries in both civil and criminal cases.
To return to Judge Andrews' argument against the law, he stated
that it was designed to favor the accused. Some indication of the
soundness of that statement niay be found in a "comparison of the
results of criminal trials with and without a jury. During the period
since the law went into effect, the statistics at hand show with sub-
stantial accuracy that in 316 trials with a jury, there were 242 con-
victions, or 76 per cent, and in the same period and in the same courts,
in 483 trials without a jury, there were 357 convictions, or 74 per cent.
In only one court did the percentage of convictions in the latter class
of cases fall substantially below that where trials were had with a
jury and there the state's attorney is remarkably successful in jury
trials, whether in civil or criminal cases. As the effect of the law is
waiving juries is very old and antedated statutory authority. See interesting
articles by the Honorable Carroll I. Bond, Annapolis, Maryland, VI Mass. Law
Quar. 89 and XI Amer. Bar Assn. Journal 699.
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to give the accused an option as to the nature of the tribunal which
will try him, it would seem almost self-evident that the law was, if
not unduly advantageous, at least advantageous, to him, yet five of
those who replied to the questionnaire denied this. The rest, however,
with great unanimity, asserted its advantage to the accused, and many
specified the particular kinds of cases in which that was peculiarly so,
although, sooth to say, after reading over the various kinds of offenses
named, one cannot but wonder a little if there was not approximate
accuracy in the reply of those who said that they could not distinguish
any class of cases in which the system had peculiar value. However,
as would be expected; many felt that there was a great gain to the
accused in a trial without a jury in cases where the nature or cir-
cumstances of the offense, or a series of offenses of one kind, had
aroused public clamor and been given much newspaper publicity; or
where the crime alleged was such as to cause an instinctive revolt in
the minds of the jury, as sexual offenses against young girls; or where
there was something in the past life, reputation or appearance of the
accused calculated to cause prejudice against him in the minds of the
jury. Many, again, specified cases where the issue was one rather of
law than fact, or where the accused was seeking the advantage of a
technical defense, or where fine distinctions had to be drawn, as be-
tween civil and criminal negligence, or between the different degrees
of a crime, or as regards two or more accused who were jointly charged
hut unequally guilty, or in statutory offenses where conviction ought
to follow only upon proof of all the elements specified in the law. So,
too, others pointed to the advantage which must come where the issues
or evidence were complicated, and the charge to a jury would neces-
sarily be long and involved, pointing to the extreme unlikelihood that
a jury of laymen could follow, understand and apply a lengthy and
involved charge. Many felt that juries did not properly apply the
presumption of innocence and the test of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and several thought that the submission of the issue to the
judge overcame the advantage which the prosecutor often has from
the popular assumption that he only arraigns: those whom he has
himself tried and found guilty, and from his acquaintance with former
jurors and the subservience of the "professional juror" to him. Ad-
vantages to the accused not so apparent were found in the opportunity
afforded him, even where conviction was sure, to present in a trial to
the court all the facts which might influence the final disposition of the
case without the disfavor which would come from putting the state
to the expense and tr6uble of a trial to the jury, and in the lessening
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of the pressure upon the attorney for the defense to secure a plea of
guilty as the best way out, where the accused feels that he is not
guilty but where the chances of conviction are great and by going to
trial he will encounter the same disfavor.G The general scope of these
considerations becomes apparent when among the specific offenses
named as most -likely to go to the court are violations of the motor
vehicle law and of the prohibition laws; criminal negligence; assault
where the issue is self-defense or several are concerned; nonsupport;
fraud; false pretenses; embezzlement; breach of trust; conspiracy;
forgery; arson; rape; carnal knowledge of minor females7 ; and man-
slaughter by automobiles.
Much of the information just summarized was secured in answer to
a question as to the determining factors which led to a choice of the
court as the tribunal to try the accused. Certain other answers given
to this question are of interest. Of course, the ultimate question is, in
which tribunal will the accused stand the best chance of acquittal, but
in answering it many things are considered, those already suggested
and others. Apparently it is in most instances counsel who determine
the question and his own predilictions enter largely into it, as his natural
preference for trying cases to the jury or the court, and the like.
In making his decision, generally the attorney considers also the repu-
tation and personality of the judge, asking whether he inclines to
leniency or severity, hews fast to the law or is open to the influence of
sympathy or pity, and what his attitude is supposed to be toward the
particular offense, or toward the prosecutor or counsel. So the per-
GOne of the directors at the State Prison has told the writer that the hard-
est prisoners they have to deal with are those who plead guilty under these cir-
cumstances because of a rankling sense of injustice which preys upon their
minds and causes them to feel that they have been cheated wrongfully of their
liberty.
7one attorney says: "There is one class of criminal cases wherein the sys-
tem has a peculiar value, that is, cases involving offenses against women. After
seventeen years of experience in the trial of criminal cases of all kinds, and
from my observation of the trial of cases tried by other lawyers, I think the
greatest injustice in the administration of our criminal law has been done by jur-
ies in this peculiar class of cases, but since the advent of the new system, I find
that the hysteria of sympathy which usually exists with the jury in favor of the
complaining witness is absent in cases tried to the court, and that the judges
weight the evidence and test the evidence of the complaining witness the same as
the testimony of other witnesses and apply the same standards of judging the
truthfulness of her story."
Another attorney writes: "The story of abuse coming from a lisping child
witness, whose ribboned hair comes to the top of the witness box, will sweep the
ordinary jury to a verdict of guilty at the conclusion of its recital and if the
State's Attorney has a torn undergarment, marked Exhibit A, to wave before thejur.rs' eyes, no further evidence is necessary and a protest of innocence by the
accused and all of the evidence, tending to prove innocence goes for naught.
Such a case should be tried to a court."
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sonnel of the jury or its record for the term may determine the choice.
In general, if the accused has a strong case or the state a weak one,
he prefers a trial to the court; but if he considers his chances of
escape are slim, he prefers the jury, hoping that at least one or two
may hold out for acquittal. The same considerations which lead to a
choice of the judge where there is prejudice against him point to choice
of the jury when he, or she, can count on sympathy or when there are
extenuating circumstances not cognizable by a strict adherence to the
rules of law.8
If there are advantages in the system for the accused, several
answers to the questionnaire point out those which come to the state,
in the greater expedition of business, the less time required in the trial
of cases, with the consequent saving of expense, and the smaller number
of appeals and reversals ;9 and suggest the particular gain which comes
in the disposition of the more trivial cases in this way. So in the case
s Judge Bond, in the article upon the Maryland practice already referred to,
VI Mass. Law Quar. 89, thus deals with this matter: "As to the reasons which
move defendants and their counsel to elect trial-by the court, a judge is not the
best possible informant; he is not often taken into the confidence of the defense
on such points. Some of the commoner reasons are quite obvious, however.
The possibility that the jury in a particular case may be unfavorably disposed
toward the accused is probably the most frequent ground of the election. When,
for instance, the crime has aroused much anger in the community from which
the jury is chosen, or when the .prisoner himself is at a disadvantage by reason
of a known record, or otherwise, trial before the court alone is usually pre-
ferred. Recently a group of automobile bandits who had robbed a county bank and
incidentally killed one of the officers, a crime which naturally stirred the neigh-
borhood deeply, elected trial before the court on the charge of murder; they
were all but one found guilty of murder in the first degree. Colored prisoners,
who make up a large proportion of the defendants in the courts of this State,
commonly prefer this sort of trial in order to avoid the possibility of racial
prejudice in the jury box. Colored men charged with crimes against women
nearly always elect trial by the court, I should say. . . . Trial before the
court alone is often preferred when a defense is based mainly on a point of law,
for the reason that in Maryland juries are judges of questions of law, as well as
of questions of fact, uncontrolled by instructions from the court, and a decision
on a pure question of law cannot well be obtained except by submission of the
whole case to the court-once the stage of demurrer or special.plea has been
passed. At times I have thought the election of a court trial was made with the
idea that the judge with his greater experience would penetrate a weak spot in
the prosecution, or see strength in a'peculiar defense, better than a jury would..
. . The judges as they go along ask questions to clear up matters for them-
selves. They may, without inconvenience interrupt a tial and hold it open for
days until other witnesses they might like to hear are hunted up. They may hold
it under advisement for days, after all the evidence is in, to reflect upon it.
Sometimes the examination of witnesses suggests the existence of additional evi-
dence which may go right to the point of final difficulty in the judge's mind and
where the evidence may be on the side of the accused the judge is especially
careful to bring it into the case. I have seen great benefit come to the accused
from a long suspension to get such additional evidence."5One attorney sums it up in this way: "If more speedy, less costly, and
more dignified trials, arriving at more accurate results, are a desirable goal in
the administration of justice, then the trial of criminal cases without a jury is a
long step in the right direction."
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of offenses of an immoral nature, the court can better curb the at-
tendance of the morbidly curious, and avoid some unwholesome pub-
licity. Of the prosecutors who replied only two felt that the system
placed the prosecution under a handicap, 10 and one placed this largely
upon the ground of the difficulties which would arise should one of
two jointly charged choose the jury and the other the court;" while
bench and bar were almost unanimous in the view that the system did
not unduly burden the state and, several were emphatic that it was a
positive benefit.
Judge Andrews' argument that judges are not sound triers of the
issues of fact in criminal cases finds some support in the answers to the
questionnaire. The predominating feeling among the prosecutors is
that juries, on the whole, reach as accurate results as do the judges
On the other band, most of the judges feel, perhaps not unnaturally,
that they can; determine the question of guilt or innocence more
accurately than can the jury, and of the lawyers a very large
proportion, some eighty per cent, support that view. Nor is it con-
sidered by judges, prosecutors or counsel, with a few exceptions, that
the system imposes an undue burden upon the judiciary, although
several, including five of the judges, consider it inadvisable to ask a
single judge to determine charges involving the death penalty, 2 some
suggesting that at least two or three judges should preside in such
cases; and a few think that others of the more serious offenses ought
not to be left to the decision of one man.
10One of the most experienced prosecutors replied that the law did not bur-
den the prosecution; "on the contrary, the expense is less and the work of trial
and preparation is easier and the result is more speedily obtained."
"Again quoting judge Bond as to the practice in Maryland: "There is
some difficulty in the situation which results from a difference in the elections of
two or more persons jointly indicted, and who should be tried jointly. I am
informed that in one of the judicial circuits of the State it has been held that
both must take a jury trial if one elects it, but this is, I believe, at odds with the
practice elsewhere. In the other counties it has apparently been the practice in
that situation to try the prisoners separately, holding two trials; the difference in
elections has been treated as compelling a severance. In Baltimore City it has
been the practice, for some years, at least, to hold the joint trial unaffected by
the difference; the judge and the jury have been hearing the evidence of the wit-
nesses once for all, and while the jury has been out, instfucted to confine its ver-
dict to defendants who have elected a jury trial, the judge has rendered his ver-
dict as to the remainder. Recently the Court of Appeals has held this city prac-
tice not permissible."
"I am not aware that as yet any charge of first degree murder has been
tried without a jury. In that respect, the law has not had a fair trial. One
wonders whether there might not develop an unfortunate situation should some
notorious murder trial such as the Loeb-Leopold case in Chicago, come before a
single judge for decision. On the other hand, we have had ever since 1846 a
l .w which permits one charged with murder to plead guilty, and this makes it
the duty of the judge to determine the degree of the crime, and, while it has
been invoked, not rarely, there has been no substantial criticism of its operation.
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To conclude in a word: The replies to the questionnaire were
sufficient in number and the experience of the writers under the law so
varied, that they may be taken as fairly representative of the judgment
of the bench and bar of Connecticut. In the light of that judgment,
there can be no doubt that the law has worked successfully and there
is no reason to believe that it will not continue to do so, except, per-
haps, in cases involving capital punishment.
